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Abstract
This explorative paper investigates how firms in the global data-processing industry that seek patent protection for their
innovations in Europe have coped with the patentability requirements of the European Patent Office. Starting from a
continuous research spectrum with basic research on the one extreme and development on the other, the main hypothesis is
as follows: firms that carry out more basic research are more successful in passing the patent office than firms that focus
more on development. Basic research explores more novel and unknown technical paths, while development aims more at
modifying and redesigning existing products. Therefore, the results from more basic-oriented research are expected to fulfill
the patentability requirements relatively more often than the results from development. This hypothesis is tested and largely
. confirmed for the global data-processing industry with a sample of 44 firms in the period 1986–1990, using indirect
variables for basic research and development. q1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: L63; O19; O34
Keywords: Patent procedure; Patentability requirements; Data-processing industry
1. Introduction
Not all patents applied for are eventually granted
by a patent office. Applications must pass a patent
granting procedure which examines and selects in-
ventions. In most modern systems, a patent is only
.  . granted for an invention that: i is new; ii involves
. an inventive step; and iii is industrially applicable
. Cornish, 1989 . This paper is a first and explorative
attempt to investigate empirically how firms have
) Corresponding author. Tel.: q44-1716296787; Fax: q44-
1714935937; E-mail: Theon_vanDijk@nera.co.uk
coped with these patentability requirements.
1 The
analysis focuses on the ‘success ratio’ of an individ-
ual firm, which is defined as the proportion of all
applications of a firm that are granted a patent. The
1 The patent-granting procedure, and the way firms have coped
. with it, has not been studied before. Griliches 1989 provides
some estimates of the waiting times between applications and
. grants in the US patent office. Pakes 1986 and Schankerman and
.  Pakes 1986 use information from the patent procedure the
. annual renewal fees in order to estimate the value of patents
. already granted. In a sense, the study of Mansfield et al. 1981 is
most related to this paper as it examines innovation and imitation
strategies in the presence of patent protection.
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main hypothesis advanced and tested in this paper is
that the success ratio can be explained by the type of
research a firm carries out. A firm that carries out
more basic research is expected to have a higher
success ratio than a firm that carries out develop-
ment. The patenting performance is studied for firms
in one particular industry, the data-processing indus-
try, that have filed applications in one particular
patent office, the European Patent Office. Limiting
the analysis to a single industry and patent office
allows one to make some assumptions about rela-
tively ‘homogeneous’ conditions for all firms. Indus-
. try appropriability conditions Levin et al., 1987 , for
example, are similar to all firms, and applications are
handled by the same group of patent examiners,
specialized in the field of data-processing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
explains the main hypothesis tested in this paper.
Section 3 describes the two data sets and takes a
closer look at the data-processing industry. Section 4
is the core of the paper and presents the estimation
results. Section 5 examines the success ratios and the
waiting times for different countries in the European
Patent Office. Finally, Section 6 offers some con-
cluding remarks.
2. Main hypothesis
The main hypothesis advanced in this paper is
that the success ratio can be explained by the type of
research of the filing firm. Type of research can be
located on the ‘research spectrum’ with at one ex-
treme pure basic research, in the middle oriented
basic and applied research, and at the other extreme
development. Firms that allocate relatively more re-
sources to the basic research extreme are expected to
be more successful with their patent applications
than firms that carry out relatively more develop-
ment.
2 Research towards the basic research extreme
explores more novel and unknown technical paths.
2  Of course, knowledge from pure basic research for example,
. scientific discoveries is hardly patentable. But this is not the type
of research firms usually carry out. What we have in mind are
firms that carry out application-oriented research, which can be
relatively more directed either towards basic research or towards
development.
Innovations that result from it are therefore expected
to meet the patentability requirements more often.
Development aims more at modifying and redesign-
ing products. Due to the stronger connection with
existing products, the innovations are expected to
pass the patent office less easily. Assuming a consis-
tent patent office policy, more basic research is thus
expected to outperform, with respect to success ra-
tios, development.
3. Description of the data
3.1. The European Patent Office
. The European Patent Office EPO , which per-
forms the administrative tasks of the Munich Euro-
. pean Patent Convention EPC , came into force in
the second half of 1978. Since then, firms have been
able to apply for a European patent. Rather than
applying for separate patents in various European
countries, a firm may apply for a European patent,
which is valid in all EPC-connected countries the
firm chooses. Important parts of national patent laws
are still valid for the European patent; there is, as
yet, no common European patent law. As expected,
the EPO has gradually taken over the work of the
national patent offices in Europe. The most impor-
tant reason for this is that a European patent is often
less expensive than various national patents. In prac-
tice, patent attorneys suggest following the European
route if firms want protection in three or more
European countries, in which case a European appli-
 cation is less expensive see Vanhaverbeke and van
. Cayseele, 1992 for more evidence on this issue .
The first data set used here contains information
on European patent applications. The set is called
‘espace bulletin’ and is published by the EPO six
times a year. The CD-ROM used for this study is the
fifth of 1993 and contains all patent applications
filed in the EPO from June 1978 to August 1993,
plus their procedural status. It is possible, for exam-
ple, to check whether an application has been with-
drawn or granted, which firm is the applicant, from
which country the applicant originates and to which
technical field the invention belongs, according to
. the International Patent Classification IPC . A major
advantage compared to other sets—for example, that
of the US patent office—is that it enables one to() T. Ían Dijk, G. DuystersrResearch Policy 27 1998 937–946 939
check whether or not an application is approved, and
when.
3.2. The data-processing industry
The second data set is on the data-processing
industry. The data-processing industry is not synony-
mous with the computer industry. Although the
data-processing industry mainly consists of computer
firms, part of the telecommunications industry is also
part of it. During the 1960s and 1970s, the market
was dominated by IBM and the lead position of IBM
has continued to the present. IBM still had the first
position in the period 1986–1990, which is the pe-
riod studied in this study. However, the dominance
of IBM decreased in the 1980s. In 1986 IBM had a
market share of 28.3% which decreased to 23.5% in
1990. The four-firm revenue concentration ratio was
41.8% in 1986 and 38.4% in 1990. Thus, of the
4.8% loss in market share of IBM, only 1.4% went
to the three firms after IBM. This is largely the result
 of the entrance of Japanese firms see Duysters and
Hagedoorn, 1995 for the internationalisation of the
. data-processing industry in the 1980s .
The data set used in this study covers the 100
largest firms in the data-processing industry world-
. wide by 1990 data-processing revenues for the
period 1986–1990. These data have been collected
by a private consulting firm, called the Gartner
Group, and are summarized in its report ‘Yardstick
Top 100 Worldwide’, September 1991. Table 1 ex-
hibits some key figures of the data-processing indus-
try taken from this data set and the EPO. Combining
rows 1 and 2 in Table 1 indicates that the firms
active in the market do not tend to concentrate on
data-processing: on average, only 31.5% of the cor-
porate revenues originate in the data-processing mar-
ket. In this data-processing market, the revenues
were growing at the high average annual rate of
17.5% in the years 1986–1988, but slowed to 8.2%
for the years 1989–1990. The average annual R&D
expenditures are 207.7 million. The average R&D
. intensity R&D expenditures per revenues is 9.2%.
4. Determinants of success ratio differences
Having provided some backgrounds of the data
sets and the industry, the analysis can now focus on
the specific problem posed in the Introduction. As
outlined above, the main hypothesis is that firms that
carry out relatively more basic research have a higher
success ratio than firms that carry out more develop-
ment. Before presenting the results, first we want to
make two comments on the analysis performed. The
first comment concerns the explanatory variables
used in the estimations. Since the set on the data-
processing industry does not contain direct data on
the type of research performed by a firm, indirect
variables are used that indicate the degree of funda-
mental research a firm carries out, or is expected to
carry out. In Section 4.1, we will explain which
variables are included and for what reason.
The second comment involves some assumptions
about the patenting behavior of firms. There is no
explicit theoretical framework underlying the patent-
ing decision of a firm. This study must be considered
as a first and crude attempt to analyse patenting
performances. Some assumptions used simplify the
analysis considerably and still seem appropriate in a
Table 1
.  Annual key figures of the top 100 data-processing DP firms in 1986–1990 revenues and expenditures in millions of dollars; employment
. in a employees
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Corporate revenue 7171.1 11,998.3 237.8 59,765
DP revenue 2259.5 5853.4 207.8 54,891.2
R&D expenditure DP 207.7 619.7 0 5715
DP employment 16,563.7 41,136.8 662 375,587.2
R&D employment DP 1853.1 4181.6 0 35,714.0
a Applications 131.0 327.6 0 1980
a Grants 32.5 91.9 0 619
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first exploring study. Firms are, for example, as-
sumed to apply for a patent for any innovation that
might be patentable. Because the outcome of the
patent procedure is very hard to predict, the probabil-
ity of success for each firm is assumed to be equal to
the unconditional probability of success. Another
assumption concerns the legal support for the appli-
cant firm. Patent attorneys or in-house patent depart-
ments of large firms are assumed to be equally
capable. In other words, we assume a transparent and
competitive market for legal support.
Section 4.1 will explain the variables that are
included in the estimations. The estimation method
and the results are presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.1. Variables of specification
The dependent variable is the success ratio of
grants to applications for each individual firm in the
. data-processing industry ‘success’ . The success ra-
tio is calculated for EPO applications in the period
1986–1990. We take all applications of a firm in the
 IPC classes b41), g06) and h01) main and sup-
. plementary . These classes fairly well describe the
data-processing industry. Next, we look at the num-
ber of grants until August 1993 resulting from these
applications. An application may have been with-
drawn by the applicant, disapproved by EPO exam-
iners, or may still be in process. Most of the 1986–
1990 applications are still in the examination pro-
cess. Thus, the success ratio does not give the abso-
lute proportion of applications being awarded a
patent. However, the differences between the provi-
sional success ratios are still expected to provide the
necessary information on interfirm differences. A
priori, there is no reason to believe that the waiting
times in the EPO are not identical for each firm
3
. Section 5 will address this issue .
Out of the top 100, 35 firms have not filed an
application, so that the success ratio for these firms
cannot be calculated. We have carried out regres-
sions including only firms with five or more EPO
applications. The sample then reduces to 44 firms.
We have taken five applications instead of one in
3 Actually, some country dummies are introduced to deal with
possible differences in waiting lags.
 order to reduce the effect of extreme variables if a
firm applies for only one patent and is granted this
patent, the success ratio is 1 and a complete outlier
. compared to the rest .
The available data set does not contain direct data
on the type of research. Thus, we are looking for
variables that indicate the degree of basic research
that firms perform. Most of the explanatory variables
presented below are inspired by this notion.
The first explanatory variable proposed is the
ratio of patent applications to R&D expenditures,
 also known as the propensity to patent Scherer,
. 1983 . This variable, labelled as ‘propens’, is ob-
tained as follows. The total number of applications in
the period 1986–1990 is divided by the total R&D
expenditures for data processing in that same period.
No lag between R&D and patenting is included
because there is evidence that most patent applica-
 tions are filed early in the innovation process Hall et
. al., 1986 . We thus obtain the number of applications
per million dollar of R&D. It should be stressed that
the absolute expenditures will not provide informa-
tion on type of R&D: focussing relatively more on
basic research may cost as much focussing more on
development. The same argument holds for the R&D
intensity, defined as the R&D to revenues ratio. The
propensity to patent, however, does provide some
information on the type of research performed. Re-
search that is more oriented towards basic research is
expected to result in more patent applications per
unit expenditure. Think, for example, of a key inno-
vation around which a cluster of improvement patents
is possible. More development-oriented research
concentrates more on specific products or processes
and is therefore expected to generate a smaller num-
ber of patent applications. A positive sign is there-
fore expected for ‘propens’. Notice that besides type
of research, the propensity to patent may also reflect
learning from and experience with filing patent ap-
plications. This reinforces the positive relationship.
The second and third variables are inspired by the
notion that diversification induces more basic re-
. . search. Nelson 1959 and Arrow 1962 have argued
that a more diversified firm can spread risks better
and is therefore more inclined to do basic research.
Moreover, the output of basic research can be used
in more, maybe unexpected, market segments, mak-
ing the payoff of basic research higher. This is() T. Ían Dijk, G. DuystersrResearch Policy 27 1998 937–946 941
particularly true for companies in the data-processing
industry.
. In a recent study Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1995 ,
empirical research on the same set of data-processing
companies has shown that the internally generated
technological core competencies of these companies
can be applied beyond the traditional data-processing
industry. Firms with a combination of a strong and
coherent technology base and more diversified sales
were found to perform significantly better than com-
panies that were more specialized in terms of their
sales orientation. This is in line with the increased
recognition that technological convergence is one of
the major driving forces of technological and eco-
nomic developments in the data-processing market
Georghiou et al., 1986; de Jonquieres, 1989;
. Forester, 1993; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1998 . For
a very long time, technological development in the
various information technology markets has followed
very distinct trajectories. Today, the basic design
parameters which form the core of technological
. regimes Georghiou et al., 1986 have become in-
creasingly similar, not only in terms of the material
properties but also with respect to the manufacturing
process involved. Technological convergence is
therefore gradually removing the sectoral boundaries
between the various information technology industry
 segments. Another recent study Duysters and Hage-
. doorn, 1998 has shown that data-processing compa-
nies are focusing their basic research in three major
fields; computers, telecommunications and micro-
electronics. Because of the effects of the conver-
gence process, a basic knowledge base consisting of
computer, telecommunications and microelectronic
know-how can be effectively applied to three basic
industries: the computer industry, the telecommuni-
cations industry and the microelectronics industry.
Moreover, basic research in one of these areas can be
applied to each of these three industries. As men-
tioned previously, basic research leads to more suc-
cessful patenting because the novelty requirements
are met more easily. In the data-processing industry,
technological competition takes place on the level of
. the sophistication of components Duysters, 1996 .
The complex character of these components in com-
bination with the cumulative and path dependent
 character of technological knowledge Nelson and
. Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988 enhances the need for
basic research. An in-depth analysis of the data-
. processing industry Duysters, 1996 has shown that
the field where most progress can be made is on the
level of the individual components. Because of the
scientific character of research in this area, basic
research is a necessity to innovate. Novelties can
hardly be created by merely putting together differ-
ent sets of components. Therefore, we contend that
basic research is more important to generate innova-
tions than system knowledge and complementarities.
In this paper, we distinguish internal from exter-
nal diversification. By internal, we mean diversifica-
tion within the data-processing market. A measure
for internal diversification is the number of DP
market segments in which the firm has been active in
the period 1986–1990, divided by the total number
of segments during that period. We label this vari-
able as ‘divers’ and expect a positive sign for it. The
segments within the data-processing market are
mainframes, superminis, minicomputers, microcom-
puters, CADrCAMrCAE, peripherals, data commu-
nication hardware, software, maintenance, service
. and other. Over the period 5 years concerned, the
total number of segments was 55. The variable ‘di-
vers’ is thus continuous by approximation. The other
variable is associated with the degree of external
diversification of a firm. This variable is defined as
the total revenues from the data-processing market
divided by the total corporate revenues, for the pe-
riod 1986–1990. Label this variable as ‘specialis’.
The same arguments as in the case of internal diver-
sification can be used to justify the inclusion of
‘specialis’. A negative sign is therefore expected.
However, it is felt that, since the spill-overs within
the market are probably stronger than those coming
from outside the market, ‘specialis’ will play a less
important role than ‘divers’.
The fourth explanatory variable is proposed to
describe the main focus of a firm, which can either
be on innovation or on marketing. Define the vari-
able ‘market’ as the ratio of Sales and Marketing
employees to R&D employees in data processing. A
firm that stresses R&D and wants to compete pri-
marily through innovation is expected to know the
technical fields and current patents better and thus to
have a higher success ratio. In contrast, a firm that
focuses on sales and marketing, as a means to com-
pete knows less of the existing technologies in the() T. Ían Dijk, G. DuystersrResearch Policy 27 1998 937–946 942
market, has less patenting experience, and is thus
expected to achieve a lower success ratio. A negative
sign is expected for ‘market’. The next variable is
concerned with the personnel in the research depart-
ment. Let ‘rdequip’ be defined as the R&D expendi-
tures per R&D employee. The idea behind this
variable is that researchers involved in basic research
have more equipment at their disposal. So a positive
sign is expected for this variable.
The final two variables are suggested to catch
some fixed effects. The first is a country dummy.
Each country has a different national patent system,
which may affect the strategies of firms as well as
the experience with patent offices in general. Fur-
thermore, the waiting times of processing in the EPO
may differ between the countries of origin of the
applicants. Some countries may have to wait longer
than other countries. The data-processing firms are
 divided into three groups by region of origin of their
. .  . headquarters : United States ‘US’ , Japan ‘JP’ and
. 4 Europe ‘EC’ . The regressions will include two of
. the three dummies ‘US’ and ‘JP’ .
The second dummy variable included indicates
. the primary market segment by revenue in which
the firm is active. The 11 segments are regrouped
. into three. The first ‘computer’ contains the core of
the data-processing industry with the mainframe,
supermini, minicomputer and microcomputer seg-
. ments. The second group ‘noncore’ contains the
CADrCAMrCAE, peripheral and data communica-
tion segments. Finally, the third group contains the
 software, services and maintenance segments ‘sup-
. port’ . We expect that ‘computer’ and ‘noncore’ play
a larger role than ‘support’, because this last group
contains such segments as service and software,
which rarely can be protected by patents.
4.2. Estimation method
. Ordinary Least Squares OLS estimations can
cause problems in the context studied here because
the dependent variable ‘success’ cannot be smaller
than 0 or greater than 1 and is thus doubly truncated
4  The US group contains 62 firms including one Canadian
. firm , the Japanese group 19 firms including three Taiwanese
. firms and the European group 19 firms.
see Maddala, 1983 for more details on truncated and
. censored variables . Instead of OLS, a two-limit
. also known as ‘doubly truncated’ Tobit estimation
model is more appropriate. The Tobit model deals
properly with the lower limit of 0 and the upper limit
of 1 of the dependent variable ‘success’. In fact, the
. two-limit Tobit model provides three estimates: i of
the chance that the success ratio is zero, i.e., whether
 or not a firm is granted at least one patent this is a
. . probit ; ii of the chance that all applications are
.  . granted a patent another probit ; and iii of the
success ratio, given that it is not equal to 0 or 1
. regression part .
4.3. Results
Three equations have been estimated: one with all
the variables outlined above, one with exclusion of
the market segment dummies, and finally one with
‘divers’ as the only explanatory variable.
The variable for internal diversification, ‘divers’,
performs very well; it has the expected sign and is
statistically highly significant. Notice that in the
estimation with ‘divers’ as the only explanatory vari-
. able iii , the standard error of the estimation is only
a small fraction larger than in the estimations includ-
. ing all explanatory variables i . So ‘divers’ is the
most important variable in the estimations.
Since larger firms are more diversified in general,
one might object that firm size does the job rather
than the degree of diversification. In order to check
for that, we have defined ‘dprev’, the revenues in the
period 1986–1990, as an indication of size. The
variables ‘divers’ and ‘dprev’ indeed correlate signif-
icantly. The two-limit Tobit estimation with ‘dprev’
as the explanatory variable is given by: successs
. . 0.1694 5.703 q5.5318Ey7 1.349 dprev. ‘Dprev’
is statistically not significant at the 5% level, while
‘divers’ is highly significant if it is the only explana-
 . . tory variable check iii in Table 2 . Thus, it can be
concluded that diversification has more power than
firm size in explaining the success ratios.
The next variable, ‘propens’, performs well in
. regression ii ; it has the expected sign and is statisti-
cally significant at the 0.5% level. Therefore, it can
 be concluded that a high propensity to patent appli-
. cations to R&D expenditures ratio of a firm in the
data-processing industry is indeed an indication of() T. Ían Dijk, G. DuystersrResearch Policy 27 1998 937–946 943
Table 2
Results of the two-limit Tobit estimations
.  .  . Variable i ii iii
. . . Constant 0.2068 2.167 0.1798 2.070 y0.0218 0.360
. . . Divers 0.2922 2.858 0.2779 3.299 0.3574 3.394
. . Propens 0.0306 0.867 0.0616 2.819 –
. . US y0.1728 y2.554 y0.2083 y3.586 –
. . JP y0.1703 y2.865 y0.1794 y3.015 –
. Computer 0.0273 0.307 – –
. Noncore 0.0275 0.412 – –
. Specialis y0.0990 y1.235 – –
. Market y0.0003 y0.024 – –
. Rdequip y0.1497 y0.718 – –
Mean log-lik. 21.011 19.54 11.603
Std. error 0.1113 0.1147 0.1421
a Cases 44 44 44
The dependent variable is ‘success’. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The standard errors used to calculate these t-statistics are
heteroscedastic-consistent estimates.
the degree of fundamental research and as such
associated with good patenting performance.
The country dummy variables ‘US’ and ‘JP’ per-
.  . form very well in the i and ii estimations. They
both have a negative sign, statistically significant at
the 1% level. So US and Japanese firms have lower
success ratios than European firms. Section 5 studies
these country differences in more detail. The market
segment dummy variables perform rather poorly.
5. National waiting times and success ratios
The results with respect to the country dummies
.  . in the above regressions i and ii indicate that US
and Japanese data-processing firms have signifi-
cantly lower success ratios than European firms for
their applications during 1986–1990. There are two
possible reasons for this. First, US and Japanese
firms may have to wait longer for their grants. Fewer
of their 1986–1990 applications are then processed,
resulting in lower success ratios. This possibility will
be examined in Section 5.1. A second reason may be
that US and Japanese firms just perform worse be-
cause of their country of origin, while European
firms may perform systematically better in the EPO.
This possibility will be examined in Section 5.2.
5.1. National waiting times
The waiting times for the data-processing industry
are first determined for the year of application 1986
and are calculated as follows. We have taken all
applications of a country in 1986 and checked how
many of those were granted a patent in the period
1986 to August 1993. Next, we checked how many
of these total grants were granted after how many
 years. The categories of waiting times are: 2 and
. . less , 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and more years. We have
examined the waiting times for the US, Japan, Ger-
many, France and the United Kingdom. For each of
these countries, a cumulative distribution of their
waiting times has been constructed. Using the Kol-
mogorov–Smirnov test,
5 we have tested in pairs
whether these lag distributions differ. The null hy-
pothesis is that distributions do not differ. The alter-
native hypothesis is that m must wait longer than n,
where m and n are the total grants of a country. The
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic D is the m, n
largest difference between the cumulative distribu-
tion of m and that of n. Given the large samples and
the one-tailed test we want to perform, we can use
22 . the statistic X s4Dm n r mqn which is ap- m, n
proximated by the Chi-square distribution with 2 df
. Siegel and Castellan, 1988 . Table 3 summarizes the
results.
From the Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests in Table 3,
a country ranking can be constructed for the waiting
5 The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is a nonparametric test which
. can be used to check whether two or more distributions have an
identical distribution underlying them. For more details, see Siegel
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Table 3
National differences in waiting times in the data-processing industry in 1986
2 Countries Kolmogorov–Smirnov X Significance
statistic
ms315 French grants ns640 German grants D s0.0997 8.390 0.02)p)0.01 m, n
ms640 German grants ns127 UK grants D s0.1268 6.812 0.05)p)0.02 m, n
ms127 UK grants ns950 US grants D s0.1938 16.837 p-0.001 m, n
ms950 US grants ns767 Japan grants D s0.0430 3.132 0.30)p)0.20 m, n
Source: EPO Espace Bulletin 1993r5.
times for the data-processing industry in 1986. In
order of decreasing waiting time, the ranking which
. . . . emerges is: 1 Japan; 2 US; 3 UK; 4 Germany;
. and 5 France. Only the difference between the US
and Japan is not significant at the 5% level. The
higher speed of processing European applications, as
given by the British, German and French applica-
tions, might thus partially explain the higher success
ratios of European firms found in the regressions in
Section 3.
In order to get larger samples and to check whether
these differences in processing speed have been ex-
isting from the start, we have carried out identical
tests for data-processing applications filed in the
period 1978–1985. Exactly the same order of wait-
ing times also emerges from these samples. All
. differences are highly significant -0.1% level . We
have furthermore checked whether this phenomenon
is specific to the data-processing industry. All appli-
. cations granted i.e., in all IPC classes in the period
1978–1985 were incorporated and, again, exactly the
same order as before is found with very strong
evidence. It can thus be concluded that the difference
in waiting times is not specific to the data-processing
industry. We should emphasize here that we have
only detected the differences in national waiting
times. It is outside the scope of this study to examine
 possible reasons for the differences maybe they are
due to preferential treatment given by the EPO to
European applicants or to the organizational struc-
. ture within the EPO .
5.2. National success ratios
In order to isolate the differences in EPO success
ratios of countries from the differences in waiting
times, we will focus on the period 1978–1985. The
vast majority of applications during that period were
processed by August 1993 for each country. Thus,
differences in waiting times do not affect differences
in success ratios. Table 4 presents the success ratios
of countries in the data-processing IPC classes as
well as the overall success ratios of countries.
The overall success ratios do not seem to differ
much from the ratios in the data-processing classes
for each country. The examination of data-processing
files thus appears to be not more or less stringent
than that of other files. From Table 4, it can further-
more be concluded that the lower success ratio of
Japan, which was found in the data-processing indus-
try in Section 4, is a severe misrepresentation.
Japanese firms generally perform better than Euro-
pean firms, both in data processing and overall.
How can these differences in EPO success ratios
of countries be explained? One possible explanation
may be found in the novelty requirements of the
national patent offices. If applicants are used to
stringent examination, they are more likely to care-
fully select the inventions they file. In a less strin-
gent system, they would then perform better than
applicants who are used to looser national examina-
tion. For countries outside the EPC, one might bring
forward the argument that their national offices have
already screened the applications, because those ap-
plicants may be expected to first file in their national
Table 4
EPO success ratios during 1978–1985
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office and then in the EPO.
6 The better the screen-
. ing i.e., the higher the novelty requirements , the
higher the success ratio for that country in the EPO.
We thus expect lower national success ratios to lead
to higher EPO success ratios. The national success
ratios are taken from the WIPO publication ‘100
Years Protection of Industrial Property’, which con-
tains the total number of applications and patents
granted in a country for the period 1883–1982. We
assume that the national patent offices treated resi-
dents and nonresidents in the same way. The national
success ratios then indicate the experience of na-
tional applicants with their patent office. The EPO
success ratios have been calculated for the period
1978–1985 because, as indicated previously, almost
all applications from that period were processed by
 August 1993. The sample contains 36 countries all
countries we could find data for, both in the EPO
. 7 and in the WIPO publications . For reasons out-
lined above, a two-limit Tobit model is used again.
. With the EPO success ratios ‘eposuccess’ as de-
. pendent and the national success ratios ‘natsuccess’
as independent variable, the estimation is given by:
eposuccesss0.7392 10.891 .
y0.2581 y2.648 natsuccess. .
The t-ratios are given in parentheses. The coeffi-
cient of ‘natsuccess’ has the expected sign and is
statistically significant at a 0.5% level. It can thus be
concluded that national success ratios are indeed of
influence in explaining the EPO success ratios.
The argument brought forward above might be
called ‘Porterian’
8 in the sense that stronger domes-
tic screening implies better foreign performance. An-
other, more indirect and speculative, reason behind
the inverse relationship might be found in the type of
incentive provided by a patent system. A patent
system that sets high barriers for applicants, by
means of high novelty requirements, may induce
6 This is also common practice for much European applicants.
7 The following countries have been included: Argentina, Aus-
. tralia, Austria, Belgium, Brasil, Bulgary, Canada, Cyprus, former
Czechoslovaky, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Nether-
. lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, former Soviet
Union, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK,
. . US, former West-Germany, former Yugoslavia.
8 . As explained by Porter 1990 .
more basic research. More development research
may be induced by a patent system with less strin-
gent novelty requirements.
6. Conclusions
This paper provides a first and exploring empiri-
cal analysis of the way firms cope with the
patentability requirements of patent offices. The main
hypothesis is that the proportion of successful appli-
cations of a firm depends on the type of underlying
research. More basic research leads to more success-
ful applications than more development-oriented re-
search. The argument is that more basic research
explores more novel and unknown paths, only weakly
related to existing products, and therefore meets the
patentability requirements more often. At the other
extreme, development aims at modifying and re-
designing existing products is more closely con-
nected to these products, and consequently its fruits
less easily pass the patent office.
This hypothesis has been tested for the data-
processing industry in the period 1986–1990. Since
no direct data on basic research vs. development
were available, the success ratios of data-processing
firms in the EPO are explained by indirect variables
. indicating the expected degree of basic research.
One such variable is diversification. As argued by
. . Nelson 1959 and Arrow 1962 , more diversified
firms are expected to do more basic research because
they can better spread the risks and apply the results
in more fields. Indeed, the variable for diversifica-
tion within the data-processing market turns out to
be the most important in explaining the success
ratios. Another variable, the propensity to patent,
also performs well. More basic research does not
only result in more patent applications but also in
better patenting performance.
Another result is that US and Japanese firms
achieved lower success ratios for their applications
in the period 1986–1990. However, it is found that
this is due to the longer waiting times between
applications and patents granted in the EPO for US
and Japanese firms, compared to European firms.
Without this difference in waiting times, Japanese
applicants in general have higher success ratios than
European and US applicants. Moreover, we have
found some evidence that national patent offices act() T. Ían Dijk, G. DuystersrResearch Policy 27 1998 937–946 946
as screening institutes for the EPO. Countries with-
out stringent screening, visualized by low novelty
requirements, perform worse in the EPO than coun-
tries that apply more stringent screening.
Finally, it must be stressed that this paper has a
strongly explorative nature. Future research must
develop a theoretical model for patent application
decisions of firms. Other industries besides the data-
processing industry should be studied to check for
 the robustness of the results preferably using data
. sets with direct variables about the type of research .
The reason behind the longer waiting times for
Japanese and US firms should be studied more care-
fully.
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